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ABSTRACT Smart city sensing calls for crowdsensing via mobile devices that are equipped with various
built-in sensors. As incentivizing users to participate in distributed sensing is still an open research issue, the
trustworthiness of crowdsensed data is expected to be a grand challenge if this cloud-inspired recruitment
of sensing services is to be adopted. Recent research proposes reputation-based user recruitment models
for crowdsensing; however, there is no standard way of identifying adversaries in smart city crowdsensing.
This paper adopts previously proposed vote-based approaches, and presents a thorough performance study
of vote-based trustworthiness with trusted entities that are basically a subset of the participating smartphone
users. Those entities are called trustworthy anchors of the crowdsensing system. Thus, an anchor user is
fully trustworthy and is fully capable of voting for the trustworthiness of other users, who participate in
sensing of the same set of phenomena. Besides the anchors, the reputations of regular users are determined
based on vote-based (distributed) reputation. We present a detailed performance study of the anchor-based
trustworthiness assurance in smart city crowdsensing through simulations, and compare it with the purely
vote-based trustworthiness approach without anchors, and a reputation-unaware crowdsensing approach,
where user reputations are discarded. Through simulation findings, we aim at providing specifications
regarding the impact of anchor and adversary populations on crowdsensing and user utilities under various
environmental settings. We show that significant improvement can be achieved in terms of usefulness and
trustworthiness of the crowdsensed data if the size of the anchor population is set properly.
INDEX TERMS Crowdsensing, reputation, sensing as a service, smart cities, smart city sensing, smartphone
sensing, truthfulness, trustworthiness.
I. INTRODUCTION
The advances in cellular communications, as well as con-
sumer electronics have led smartphones to serve ubiquitous
computing and distributed sensing in smart city applica-
tions [1], [2]. Figure 1 illustrates various building blocks
of a smart city. While smart transportation, smart energy,
smart urban services, smart water and smart homes are major
application areas, smart citizens close the loop by participat-
ing in sensing, actuating and decision making processes [3].
This emerging community sensing paradigm is called mobile
crowdsensing, where individuals with sensing and comput-
ing devices collectively share data and extract information
to measure and map phenomena of common interest [4].
As mentioned by the forum in [5], having citizens as sensors
in a smart city, makes groups of individuals collaboratively
work towards the same goal with strong interaction links
even though this does not always require strong social links
between them. Thus, individuals form communities; collab-
orating communities form social networks where interaction
is in the form of community-based participatory sensing [6].
Today’s smartphones are equipped with various built-in
sensors that can be accessed by crowdsourcing applications
for various purposes such as urban traffic monitoring [7],
weather monitoring or noise level [8], public safety [9], [10]
and emergency preparedness [11]. Integration of smart-
phones, built-in sensors, cloud computing and big data analyt-
ics into the smart city architecture accelerates the smart city
services [12].
To the best of our knowledge, almost all crowdsensing
applications are either voluntary-based [13] or they do not
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FIGURE 1. Building blocks of a smart city.
incorporate dynamic recruitment of users [2], [14], [15].
It is worthwhile noting that there are proposals that ana-
lyze the performance of rewarding mechanisms [16]–[19],
while some of them stand out with an emphasis on truth-
fulness [20], [21]. Besides, social behavior and social trust
dimensions have also been considered to be incorporated
into crowdsensing via social credits [22]. Related work also
reports that several factors such as time and location affect
users’ decision to participate in crowdsening even for public
safety purposes [23].
Although all smart city applications call for highly accu-
rate sensing data, trustworthiness of the crowdsensed data
is of paramount importance in particular cases as follows.
Smart urban services require continuity and robustness as
they include public safety services such as crowd monitor-
ing, crowd management under extreme situations such as
disaster preparedness and recovery [24], [25]. Furthermore,
smart connected vehicles require trustworthiness in informa-
tion sharing [26] as infrastructure-less data sharing is prone
to maliciously altered information dissemination. Electric
vehicles are becoming an inseparable part of smart cities,
and energy-aware route selection is critical when cars run
on batteries. As studied by the related work [27], energy-
minimizing routes can be crowdsensed for electric vehicles
where trustworthiness of crowdsensed data is highly desired.
Despite the differences among the concepts, all studies
agree on the fact that users need to be awarded based on
the usefulness of the data that they provide. The trade-off
between rewarding users and maximizing the value of crowd-
sensed data is generally addressed by game theoretical or
auction-based approaches. As pointed out in previous work,
in the presence of adversaries, the crowdsourcer platformmay
get disinformed [28]. In [9], reputation-based smartphone
user recruitment methods have been proposed. According to
the proposal, recruitment probability of a user is a function
of its reputation/trustworthiness. Hereafter, we use trustwor-
thiness to denote the average reputation of a user over time.
We also use a crowdsensing node and a smartphone user
interchangeably. As shown in several studies, malicious users
may intermittently attack the crowdsourcer in order to avoid
being identified as an adversary. Thus, a malicious user may
keep track of its reputation based on the truthfulness of the
data, aiming to build reputation up to a certain value. Once
the upper threshold is reached, the user starts to send false
data, and this is where its reputation starts to decrease. Given
that centralized and statistical reputation-awareness can lead
to degradation in the utility of the crowdsourcer, distributed
and vote-based mechanisms can be considered. In [29],
a distributed voting solution was proposed which adopts the
vote-based Sybil detection approach in social networks [30]
such that users of a particular interest group vote for the
trustworthiness of a user that joins the group and transfer their
vote capacities to the newly joining user. Here, an interest
group denotes a group of smartphones that have at least
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one common sensing task. In order to cope with the human
factor in voting, combined approach between statistical and
vote-based reputation-awareness was proposed in [31] for
recruitment of users.
Having said that human factor affects the performance of
smartphone user recruitment and incentivization in crowd-
sensing applications, deployment of a few number of users
as anchor nodes in distributed voting can help the platform
cope with potential performance degradation due to mislead-
ing votes [3]. In this paper, we provide detailed explanation
of anchor-based trustworthiness in smart city crowdsensing,
and analyze its feasibility under various settings. We also
aim to provide design specifications for the anchor-based
trustworthiness assurance in smart city crowdsensing. More
specifically, we investigate
• the relation between the ratio of malicious users and
the ratio of anchors in the crowdsensing event to ensure
trustworthiness of the crowdsensed data,
• the impact of the relation between the ratio of malicious
users, the ratio of anchors and sensing task arrival rates
on the crowdsourcer utility in the presence of anchor
nodes in a crowdsensing system,
• the impact of the relation between the ratio of malicious
users and the ratio of anchors on the crowdsourcer util-
ity in the presence of anchor nodes in a crowdsensing
system,
• the impact of the relation between the ratio of malicious
users and the ratio of anchors on the user utility in the
presence of anchor nodes in a crowdsensing system,
• the impact of the relation between the ratio of malicious
users and the ratio of anchors on the disinformation
in the presence of anchor nodes in a crowdsensing
system.
We evaluate the performance of anchor-assisted and vote-
based trustworthiness assurance in smart city crowdsensing
via simulations. Our simulation results show that deploy-
ment of anchor nodes in smart city crowdsensing improves
crowdsourcer utility by 20% when compared to the cases
that adopt purely vote-based trustworthiness. Furthermore,
when anchor nodes are deployed in a smart city crowdsensing
scenario, crowd (user) utility is not degraded when compared
to purely vote-based trustworthiness assurance in smart city
crowdsensing. Moreover, disinformation probability at the
crowdsourcer platform can be eliminated if anchor-based
trustworthiness assurance is integrated with the decentralized
component of the trustworthiness assurance module of smart
city crowdsensing. We also show that the size of the anchor
population has to be selected properly; hence we provide
useful insights into adaptive anchoring of smartphone users
in smart city crowdsensing applications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the state of the art through a brief review
of the literature. In Section III, we present collabo-
rative trustworthiness in smart city crowdsensing, and
explain anchor-based decentralized reputation-awareness
concept in detail. Section IV presents numerical results and
provides thorough discussions on research findings. Finally,
in Section V, the paper is concluded and future directions are
given.
II. RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND
In this section, we review the research in the field of Smart
City Crowdsensing and the challenges that arise from this
concept, as well as metrics that quantify the accuracy and
usefulness (i.e., utility) of the sensed data.
A. SMART CITY CROWDSENSING
Smart city crowdsensing has recently been an emerging
topic as smartphones can provide accelerometers, gyroscopes
and GPS data as a service in order to monitor crowd den-
sity and recognize human activities [24], [32]. A mobile
crowdsensing architecture was presented in [33] by adopting
service-oriented architecture design principles for resource
optimization in smart city crowdsensing. In [2], besides
defining a crowdsensing system in a smart city, the authors
outline the requirements for a crowdsensing system design
as minimum disruption on user devices, fast processing
and prompt feedback, content sharing, extensibility, secu-
rity and complete data management workflow. In [34], the
authors present a prototype crowdsensing application for
public transport in a smart city. The crowdsensed data is
aggregated by using the Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP), an open source communication protocol
based on publish/subscribe model, which enables communi-
cating sensed tasks via Extensible Markup Language (XML).
Another transportation application in smart city crowdsens-
ing was presented in [35] where cyclists provide vibration
data in a participatory manner in order for the cloud plat-
form to determine road conditions in an urban area. In [36],
crowdsensing motion pictures via wearable cameras in a
smart city were studied. In the corresponding study, the
authors particularly focused on optimal transcoding of the
videos on wearable cameras, and to this end, an adaptive
transcoding algorithm was proposed to improve latency,
energy consumption in wearables and peak signal to noise
ratio in crowdsensed video transmission. In [37], a service
oriented framework has been presented to assess the quality
of data crowdsensed through citizens during an emergency.
Authors in [38]–[40] elaborate on an application where mul-
tiple users perform face recognition using multiple smart-
phones and multiple cloud servers.
B. INCENTIVIZING USERS
As previously mentioned, incentivizing users is a crucial
challenge for effective crowdsensing. The sensor data can
be considered to be aggregated at a cloud platform, and the
cloud platform serves as a middleware between crowdsourcer
and the smartphone users who participate in crowdsensing.
Indeed, it is viable to delegate these tasks to a cloud plat-
form as the cloud platform provides flexibility in resource
allocation, service provisioning and improved security [41].
To the best of our knowledge, the authors in [42] proposed
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user-centric and platform-centric incentives for the first
time for a generic application of crowdsourcing using
smartphones.
C. PLATFORM UTILITY OF CROWDSENSING
Platform-centric incentives aim to maximize the benefit
(i.e., utility) of the crowdsourcer (i.e., cloud platform) and
the crowd (i.e., smartphone users) by recruiting a set of
smartphone users from the crowd and assigning them sensing
tasks along with sensing schedules. User-centric incentives
rely on users’ own sensing plans and pre-announced sensing
costs, and the platform runs a reverse auction to select a subset
of users based on their sensing costs (i.e., bids in the auction)
and the value of the sensing tasks in the terrain.
1) AUCTION THEORETIC CROWDSENSING
MSensing auction was proposed to maximize both platform
and user utility which was explained and analyzed in detail
in [20]. Let ω(bi) denote a binary function that evaluates to
TRUE (i.e., 1) if the user i wins an auction by bidding bi.
In this auction, the critical value, bcri , is defined as the highest
winning bid among all users, thereby implying bi < bcri
during the auction. The authors use the monotone property
of bi to allow only the user that bids truthfully to win by
using Eq. 1
ω(b′i) =
{
1, (b′i ≤ bi ∧ ω(bi) = 1) ∨ (b′i = bcri )
0, else
(1)
where b′i quantifies a bid, b′i ≤ bi, that could also allow the
user to win. Furthermore, we know that bi > bcri would not
guarantee a winning bid for user i. Therefore, the additional
margin between bi and bcri allows the cloudsourcer to increase
its platform utility, i.e., the cost of crowdsourcing.
2) GAME THEORETIC CROWDSENSING
In [16], the authors presented the concept of discretized
crowdsensing where users participate in crowdsensing event
in discrete timeslots. A game theoretic approach has been
formulated based on the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium which
aims to maximize crowdsourcer platform utility and define
an effective strategy to adjust user utility. In [43], the authors
propose an approximationmechanism to address the trade-off
between platform utility and user utility where users compete
for the announced tasks based on the availability of their time
slots.
D. TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE CROWDSENSED DATA
Trustworthiness of the crowdsensed data is directly related
to the accuracy of smartphone sensors and reputation of
their users who have been recruited to sense the tasks of
the corresponding data [44]. The fundamental assumption
among the schemes above is that the auction participants are
trustworthy and the only malicious activity of the users in the
crowd can be joining the auction with higher bids to increase
their income. Related work proposes to adopt reputation sys-
tems to enhance the trustworthiness of the crowdsensed data.
Users that report false sensing data to the crowdsensing plat-
form can either be due to a sensor malfunction or intentional
disinformation.
1) REPUTATION BASED USER RECRUITMENT
Regardless of the cause, the crowdsensing system recruits
users that have a higher reputation by rewarding the ones
that provide useful data [9]. In [45], the authors present the
concept of S, U and E reports to assess user credibility.
S reports denote sensing activity whereas E reports denote
reports from review requests and U reports are the reports
from authorities. In [29], the authors adopt a Sybil detection
technique that was proposed for social networks [46] and tai-
lor it to the detection of adversaries in a mobile crowdsensing
system.
2) RECRUITING USERS USING SOCIAL NETWORKS
The proposed scheme in [29] called Social Network-Aided
Trustworthiness Assurance (SONATA) formulates vote-
based trustworthiness of crowdsensed data through incen-
tivized users. Users are linked in the form of a social network
community as long as they have common sensing tasks. Thus,
a community is represented as a fully connected graph, and
interconnection of these communities forms a social network.
The trustworthiness of a user is voted by the existingmembers
of the community upon joining of the user to the correspond-
ing community. It is worthwhile mentioning that joining a
community denotes having a new common sensing task with
other community membeers.
3) VOTE BASED CROWDSENSING
Each member of the community has a vote capacity and a
reputation as proposed in [46]. <j(t) is defined as the trust-
worthiness of user j at time t , having a vote capacityωj and an
actual vote χ ij for user i, the trustworthiness of newly joining
user (user i) is calculated as the weighted sum of votes of the
community members normalized by the total reputable vote
capacity as formulated in Eq. 2.
<i(t) =
∑
j|Cij=1
ωjχ
i
j<j(t)∑
j|Cij=1
ωj<j(t)
(2)
The advantage of maintaining vote-based trustworthiness
in a crowdsensing system is that historical data does not
need to be stored; reputation calculation is run in a dis-
tributed manner, allowing the platform only to deal with
running a reverse auction procedure in order to select the
smartphone users (i.e., crowd) and assess the usefulness
of the data they provide. Before we proceed with the
details of the vote-based crowdsensing with anchor nodes,
it is worthwhile to present the notation used in the paper.
Table 1 summarizes the most important details about our
notation.
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TABLE 1. The notation used in the formulation.
III. ANCHORS IN VOTE-BASED CROWDSENSING
As reported in [29], the success of vote-based trustworthiness
in crowdsensing systems is closely related to the i) ratio of
malicious users in the crowd, ii) sensing task load on the
crowdsensing system, and iii) initial reputations of the users.
In [3], possible improvement to SONATA was proposed by
assigning ‘‘anchor’’ roles to some of the nodes. An anchor
node has 100% trustworthiness during a pre-determined
period of time regardless of the accuracy of its sensor read-
ings. Thus, wrong sensor data reported by an anchor node is
presumably due to the malfunctioning of its built-in sensors
and it is not considered as malicious activity. Furthermore,
anchor nodes have full vote capacity when they are needed
to vote for a newly joining node in their communities. On the
other hand, it is worthwhile noting that an anchor node cannot
evaluate the trustworthiness of any other node better than a
non-anchor node is able to do.
A. TRUSTWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT
Figure 2 depicts a minimalist overview of vote-based mobile
crowdsensing with anchor nodes in a smart city application.
Each node is equipped with a mobile interface for crowdsens-
ing. The interface can access a node’s built-in sensors and
determine the most recent readings of a node’s connections.
Each node casts a vote for a newly joining node and publishes
its sensor data through this interface, which is basically a
mobile application.
<insti (t) is the instantaneous trustworthiness of node i at
time t and is formulated in Eq. 3 below:
<insti (t) =

∑
j|Cij=1
(ωj · χ ij · <j)∑
j|(T{i}∩T{j} 6=φ)
(ωj · <j)
, {i} ∈ U
1, {i} ∈ A
(3)
<insti (t) is computed as the weighted sum of the votes of all
nodes in its community (
∑
ωj · χ ij · <j), normalized by total
vote capacity of the voting nodes (
∑
ωj · <j). The weight of
the vote of a node j is the product of its trustworthiness and
vote capacity (ωj · <j).
1) DYNAMIC CHANGES IN TRUSTWORTHINESS
As a node’s communities change dynamically due to dynami-
cally arriving sensing task requests, its trustworthiness needs
to be adjusted dynamically. As formulated in Eq. 4, overall
trustworthiness of a node at the end of time period t (<i(t)),
is a weighted sum of its instantaneous trustworthiness
at t (<insti (t)), and its overall trustworthiness immediately
before time t (<i(t−) ). It is worthwhile noting that if the node
is assigned an anchor role (node i ∈ A), its trustworthiness is
always 1.0 as seen in the equations.
<i(t) =
δ · <
inst
i (t)+ (1− δ) · <i(t−), {i} ∈ U
<insti (t) = <i(t−) = 1, {i} ∈ A
(4)
where δ is the weighting coefficient for the transition of
trustworthiness—defined as transition coefficient for trust-
worthiness in Table 1—that captures the rate of change
in <i(t) from time t to time t−.
2) DYNAMIC CHANGES IN VOTE CAPACITY
Vote capacity of a node also changes dynamically as the node
inherits the vote capacity of the nodes that have casted votes
for it. When a node joins a new community, it inherits the
average vote capacity of the nodes with which it has just
been linked. As seen in Eq. 5, instantaneous vote capacity of
newly joining user is calculated as the average vote capacity
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FIGURE 2. Overview of vote-based mobile crowdsensing with anchor nodes in a smart city application.
of its connections.
ωinsti (t) =

∑
j|T{i}∩T{j} 6=φ
(
ωj
|Ŵ |
)
, {i} ∈ U
1, {i} ∈ A
(5)
The actual vote capacity of the node is calculated based on
running average method as shown in Eq. 6. Note the 100%
vote capacity implied for an anchor node in Eq. 5.
ωi(t) =
γ · ω
inst
i (t)+ (1− γ) · ωi(t−), {i} ∈ U
ωinsti (t) = ωinsti (t−) = 1, {i} ∈ A
(6)
where γ is the transition coefficient for trustworthiness,
which plays a similar role to δ to quantify the transition speed.
3) INTRODUCING ANCHOR NODES
As seen in Fig. 2, U2 and U4 are assigned anchor roles in a
crowdsensing application. At (t = t1), U0 joins the commu-
nity that consists of the following nodes: {U4,U5,U6,U7}.
At (t = t1), U0 has an initial trustworthiness value, (<0(t0)),
and it is combined with the voted trustworthiness value to
obtain its trustworthiness at the end of the period t1. Voted
trustworthiness of the node is contributed by the votes of U4,
U5, U6, and U7. At (t = t2), a new sensing task is scheduled
within a sensing range covering {U0,U1,U2,U3,U4}. Given
that U0 did not have any common tasks with the nodes in
this new community, U1,U2,U3,U4 vote the trustworthi-
ness of U0. Finally, weighted sum of U0’s trustworthiness at
(t = t1) and its voted trustworthiness are stored as its
trustworthiness at (t = t2).
B. USER RECRUITMENT VIA REVERSE AUCTION
As mentioned before, users can be recruited by user-centric
or platform-centric incentives [20]. As we aim at running
the data acquisition in a distributed manner, we adopt the
reputation-aware user-centric reverse auction in [9] and [47].
This reverse auction consists of the following two steps:
1) winner selection and 2) rewarding. Reverse auction-based
recruitment of users was initially proposed in [42] for the first
time. Sensing tasks arrive in bursts and the nodes that fall in
the range of a sensing task participate in the first step of the
auction by reporting its sensing cost, particularly its bid (bi)
in the auction.
1) WINNER SELECTION
From the standpoint of the platform and the end user, each
task has a predefined value (ϑt ). Therefore,W and TW being
the set of selected nodes out of the participants set and the
set of tasks sensed by the users in W , respectively; the value
of the set W is the sum of the values of the tasks in TW as
formulated in Eq. 7.
ϑ(W ) =
∑
t∈TW
ϑt (7)
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Winner selection out of the participants set involves a
sequential search process that aims at selecting the partic-
ipants that lead to positive marginal contribution to plat-
form utility. By positive marginal contribution, we denote
the difference between the marginal value of the correspond-
ing node over the selected nodes set and its sensing cost.
Equation 8 formulates the marginal value of node i (ϑi(W ))
as the difference between the values of the setW , before and
after recruiting node i.
ϑi(W ) = ϑ(W ∪ {i})− ϑ(W )
⇒ ϑ<i (W ) = ϑ<(W ∪ {i})− ϑ<(W ) (8)
The left-hand side of Eq. 8 formulates the marginal
value whereas the right-hand side presents calculation of
reputation-based marginal value of node i over the set W .
As seen in Eq. 8, reputation-based marginal value is the
difference between reputation-based values of the set before
and after recruiting node i. Here, one may ask what reputable
value of a set (ϑ<(W )) stands for. As formulated in Eq. 9, total
value of the tasks sensed by the nodes in the set,W , is scaled
by the average trustworthiness of the nodes in the set where
0t denotes the set of users that sense task t in a participatory
manner.
ϑ<(W ) =
∑
t∈TW
∑
j∈0t
(ϑt · <j
|0t |
)
(9)
As for the winner selection, the platform adds nodes until
the difference between the marginal value of node i over the
set, W , and its sensing cost is non-positive, i.e., ϑi(W ) −
bi > 0 ⇒ ϑ<i (W ) − bi/<i > 0. Similar to the previous
work [9], [47], sensing costs of the nodes are scaled by their
trustworthiness.
2) REWARDING OF THE WINNERS
Any recruited node is guaranteed to be rewarded no less than
its sensing cost. The rewardingmechanism in [9] is adopted in
this work which was built on the reputation-unaware reward-
ing in [42]. For each winner node, w, the platform runs a
secondary search to find a maximum hypothetical sensing
cost/bid that would still make node w preferred over every
other non-rewarded node, wv. At the beginning, each user
is assumed to be rewarded zero. For each winner, user w, a
temporary set P ′ is constructed which is equal to the set of
participants excluding user w as shown in Eq. 10.
P ′ = P − {w} (10)
At this point, a temporary winners set 1 is constructed
out of P . The rewarding module searches for maximum
hypothetical value for the corresponding user’s bid which
would enable winning of user w instead of user wv ∈ P ′.
Userwv stands for a user inP whose reputable marginal value
is greater than its quantified bid. Therefore, the rewarding
algorithm keeps adding those users to set1 starting from the
user that maximizes the platform utility, i.e., the difference
between the value and quantified bid as shown in Eq. 11.
wv =
argmaxv∈P′\1
(
ϑv(1)− bv<v
)
, {v} ∈ U
argmaxv∈P ′\1
(
ϑv(1)− bv
)
, {v} ∈ A
(11)
When a new user, user wv, is added to the temporary user
set1, the maximum reward that can be made to user w given
the bid value of user wv is searched. Equation 12 formulates
this process.
ρw = max
(
ρw,min
(
ϑw(1)− (ϑwv (1)− bwv ), ϑw(1)
))
(12)
Once the temporary set 1 is constructed, the nodes are
sorted with respect to their marginal contribution as proposed
in [20] and [42], however reputation-based values are used
here to ensure trustworthiness as shown in Eq. 13 and user w
is rewarded the maximum of final value of ρi and its marginal
value over the set 1.(
ϑ<wv −
bwv
<wv
)
>
(
ϑ<wv+1 −
bwv+1
<wv+1
)
(13)
The algorithm uses the quantified bids only for construct-
ing the temporary set1 as seen in Eq. 11, whereas the actual
bids are used for payment calculation as seen in Eq. 12.
Furthermore, the actual values of the set 1 is used instead
of its reputation-based value. The idea behind this distinction
is to avoid cuts in non-malicious user rewards due to possibly
sensing the same tasks with other malicious users. In [9], the
rewarding module is proposed to operate in two modes, and
the mode presented above is called the non-aggressive mode.
In case, the rewarding module always uses the quantified bids
and reputation-based values in Eqs. 11 and 12, cuts should be
expected in user rewards for the sake of increased platform
utility, and the corresponding mode is called the aggressive
rewarding mode.
In order to address the trade-off between aggressive and
non-aggressive rewarding modes, an adaptive rewarding
mode was proposed in [9] which is also adopted and adapted
to the anchor-based crowdsensing here. Thus, as formulated
in Eq. 14, if the trustworthiness of user w has increased since
its last recruitment and the user is a non-anchor user, its
reputation-based marginal value over the set W is defined as
the difference between the reputation-based values of the set
W after and before the selection of user w. On the other hand,
if the user is assigned an anchor role or its trustworthiness
has been degraded, the actual marginal value of the set W
is considered to be the reputation-based value of the set W .
This approach is used in both winner selection and rewarding
phases of the user recruitment.
ϑ<w (W ) =
{
ϑ<(W ∪ {w})− ϑ<(W ), <w ≤ <−w ∧ {w}∈U
ϑw(W ), <w > <−w ∨ {w}∈A
(14)
where <−w and <w are the trustworthiness values of node w
before and after the recruitment, respectively.
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In addition, it is worthwhile noting that recruitment of
anchor nodes is exactly the same as that of non-anchor nodes.
However, reputation-based contributions and/or bids of
anchor users are identical to their reputation-unaware formu-
lations as an anchor node is presumed to be 100% trustworthy
until the end of the monitoring period.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate anchor-based trustworthiness assurance in smart
city crowdsensing through simulations, and develop perfor-
mance specifications.
A. SIMULATION SETTINGS
We implement an object-oriented simulation environment in
Java and conduct simulations based on the settings reported
in Table 2. The sensing tasks arrive at a terrain that covers a
1000m×1000m geographic area and 1000 smartphone users
are uniformly distributed as the nodes of the crowd. As we
aim at developing performance specifications, we set the
ratio of malicious smartphone users (i.e., malicious nodes)
to 3% and 5% of the entire crowd population, covering two
different scenarios. Furthermore, we set the anchor percent-
age in the crowd (i.e., anchor nodes) to 3% and 5% of the
entire crowd population; therefore, these combinations allow
us to investigate four total scenarios, as shown in Table 3.
TABLE 2. Simulation settings.
TABLE 3. Simulated scenarios based on malicious user probability and
anchor node percentage.
Table 3 presents the four scenarios that are considered in
performance evaluation of the proposed distributed crowd-
sensing system. The crowdsensing platform assumes that
the users are trustworthy by 70% at the beginning of the
monitoring event. The event duration is set to 30 minutes
where sensing tasks arrive following a Poisson distribution
with a mean {20, 40, 60, 80} tasks/min.
As illustrated in Fig. 2, sensor readings are published
through a sensor publishing layer where historical read-
ings are available to the nodes that are in the same com-
munity. The value of a vote can be either 1 or −1. The
fundamental assumption in our study is that altered sen-
sor readings behave like the Sybil attacks in social net-
works [46]. Hence one fundamental assumption in this study
is that there is a 20% chance that the recommendation of
a truthful node casts its votes as −1 for a malicious node.
The value of a task is uniformly distributed in the range
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, whereas the sensing cost of a mobile device
ranges in {1, 2, .., 10}. Furthermore, built-in sensors can
provide accurate readings with a probability between 97%
and 98% [48]. We consider three performance metrics as
follows:
1) Crowdsensing platform utility (Up) represents the ben-
efit of the platform as a function of the value of total
sensing tasks and the total rewards made to the mobile
users [9], [42].
2) Manipulation probability (M ) can be defined as the
ratio of the sensing tasks for which at least one mali-
cious node has been rewarded throughout the monitor-
ing event. However, we herebymanipulation denote the
total rewards made to the malicious users during the
monitoring event.
3) Average user utility per unit time (Uuser ) is formu-
lated as the benefit of a smartphone user as a func-
tion of the rewards and the sensing cost of the user,
averaged by the total number of winners in each auc-
tion. To be clearer, we formulate this metric in Eq. 15
below
Uuser =
(∑
τ
((∑
i ρi
τ −∑i ciτ )
|Wτ |
)
/τduration
(15)
where ρτi and c
τ
i are the rewards received by mobile
device user i at the τ th auction and the sensing cost of
smartphone user i at the τ th auction, respectively. In the
equation, Wτ stands for the number of winners in the
τ th period which lasts as long as τduration.
As reported by related work, it is reasonable to assume
that malicious users intermittently manipulate their sensor
readings instead of continuously altering them. As smart-
phones are equipped with improved computing capability
compared to previous generation mobile devices, an adver-
sary keeps track of its historical sensing data, and based
on that it retrieves some statistical trustworthiness value for
itself. The statistical trustworthiness translates into the per-
centage of unaltered sensor readings of the smartphone user
among all readings that have been transmitted to the platform
so far. Thus, a malicious smartphone user aims at building
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reputation until its statistically estimated trustworthiness
reaches a pre-determined upper threshold (Tu), at which
point it will be incorrectly identified as a trustworthy user;
starting with that point, this user begins to send altered
messages until its statistically estimated trustworthiness hits
a pre-determined lower threshold (Tl) value, at which
point it will be detected as a malicious user, unable to
send altered messages up to the next (Tu) period. The
lower and upper threshold values are set at 0.5 and 0.8,
respectively.
The scope of this study is limited to investigating the
impact of different trustworthiness assurance approaches in
a crowdsensing environment. Therefore, physical constraints
in the wireless communication medium have not been con-
sidered. We are currently aiming at migrating our simulation
environment to a network simulator which also simulates
the physical settings. A small scale crowdsensing testbed
is currently under development as a part of the ongoing
projects in the research lab [49]. Thus, in this paper, we
leave the study of the impact of wireless medium on the
trustworthiness of crowdsensed data to our future/ongoing
work.
FIGURE 3. Simulated platform utility (Up) for different anchor node
percentage and malicious user probabilities; two different task
arrival rates are evaluated.
B. SIMULATION RESULTS
The first set of results are presented in Fig. 3 where we
study the relation between platform utility, malicious user
probability in the crowd and the anchor user percentage in
the entire crowd population under two different sensing task
arrival rates, i.e., 60 tasks/min and 80 tasks/min. As seen in
both cases, when the anchor and/or malicious user population
is as large as 7% of the entire crowd population, platform
utility cannot be maximized under either of the load levels.
Therefore, it can be concluded that under the remaining
settings, having 3–5% of the crowd population as anchor
nodes is feasible under heavier sensing task loads
(i.e., 80 tasks/min) whereas for lighter loads, in order to
ensure high platform utility, it is not feasible to have less
anchor nodes than the size of the malicious user population.
Therefore, we run our simulations under the four scenarios
presented in Table 3.
In Fig. 4, we test the presented framework under the four
scenarios each of which corresponds to a different anchor-
adversary percentage combination in the crowd population.
As seen in Fig. 4a and Fig. 4d, if the anchor population
is limited to 3% of the entire population it can be clearly
beneficial under heavier sensing task arrival rates and if and
only if the malicious user population is less than 5% of the
entire crowd population. The reason behind this phenomenon
is as follows. Having malicious population larger than the
anchor population will not help increase platform utility via
anchors. Instead, simple voting will work better as the plat-
form will be intending to recruit the anchors due to their
high trustworthiness regardless of the accuracy of their votes
and recommendations. The impact of unconsidered regular
behavioral assessment capacity of anchor users become more
severe under lightly arriving sensing tasks. On the other hand,
when the anchor and adversary population are equal to each
other (Fig. 4a), having trusted nodes help improve platform
utility when vote-based trustworthiness is adopted by the
crowdsensing incentives.
When anchor population is bigger, it is expected to
improve platform utility as observed in Fig. 4b. However,
too many anchors will dominate selection process under
heavier sensing task arrival rates when the anchor popula-
tion is larger than the malicious user population as seen in
the figure. This suppression can be eliminated by reduc-
ing the size of the anchor population. As seen in Fig. 4c,
anchor and adversary populations are set to 5% of the entire
crowd population, and the benefit of anchor-assisted and
vote-based crowdsensing is clearly observed under all load
levels.
In the next step, we evaluated the impact of anchors in the
rewards made to the malicious users while they are aiming
at disinformation at the crowdsensing platform. As pre-
vious work presents, vote-based trustworthiness assurance
(i.e., SONATA [29]) significantly reduces disinformation
probability when compared to the conventional MSensing-
based crowdsensing where reputation awareness is left
to future work [42]. Only scenario-I and Scenario-III
lead to negligible disinformation under SONATA as seen
in Fig. 5. Deploying anchor nodes in the crowdsens-
ing application can eliminate rewarding malicious users;
hence overcomes disinformation at the crowdsensing
platform.
Fig. 6 illustrates the average user utility in the crowdsens-
ing system under study. As reputation-based system scales
the sensing costs (i.e., auction bids) by the reputation of
the corresponding devices while compensating the mobile
device users [9], [47], cuts are expected in the payments to
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FIGURE 4. Simulated platform utility (Up) vs. sensing task arrival rate for four different scenarios enumerated in Table 3, each representing
a different {malicious user probability, anchor node percentage} tuple: (a) Scenario I {3%, 3%}, (b) Scenario II {3%, 5%},
(c) Scenario III {5%, 5%}, (d) Scenario IV {5%, 3%}.
FIGURE 5. Average reward made to malicious users vs. sensing task arrival rate for two different scenarios enumerated in Table 3, each
representing a different {malicious user probability, anchor node percentage} tuple: (a) Scenario I {3%, 3%}, (b) Scenario III {5%, 5%}.
the mobile device users. It is worthwhile mentioning that
every winner is compensated no less than its sensing cost.
Besides, having said that improvement in platform utility
of reputation-unaware crowdsensing is promising, reduction
in user rewards is acceptable as the value of information
provided to the end users is not counted as a part of
the reward in the crowdsensing business model. Moreover,
deployment of anchors does not lead to degradation in user
utility regardless of the size of the anchor and/or adversary
population.
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FIGURE 6. Average user utility (Uuser ) vs. sensing task arrival rate for four different scenarios enumerated in Table 3, each representing
a different {malicious user probability, anchor node percentage} tuple: (a) Scenario I {3%, 3%}, (b) Scenario II {3%, 5%},
(c) Scenario III {5%, 5%}, (d) Scenario IV {5%, 3%}.
V. CONCLUSION
Sensing-as-a-Service (S2aaS) has appeared as a promising
solution with the advent of cloud computing and Internet of
Things (IoT) paradigms accelerating smart city applications.
Crowdsensing systems enable forming connected communi-
ties of mobile devices that provide their built-in sensors as
a service for sensing several phenomena. Trustworthiness has
been pointed out as an important challenge in crowdsensing
systems since adversaries may lead to disinformation at the
service requester site through manipulation of sensor read-
ings. In this paper, we have studied vote-based crowdsens-
ing frameworks focusing on anchor-based trustworthiness
assurance by adopting a previously proposed crowdsensing
schemewhich uses only votes of the participating smartphone
users [29]. We have incorporated vote-based social trust-
worthiness assessments via a dynamic social network struc-
ture. Furthermore, we have assigned anchor roles to a subset
of participating users denoting their 100% trustworthiness
remaining unchanged during a pre-determined period of time.
According to the anchor-assisted and vote-based trustwor-
thiness assurance in a crowdsensing system, trustworthiness
of a smartphone user (i.e., crowdsensing node) is obtained
through votes of the users in the same community whereas
anchor nodes have 100% reputation and full vote capacity
throughout the monitored event.
We have studied design specifications for fully distributed
and vote-based smart city crowdsensing via simulations.
Through simulations, we have shown that deployment of
anchor nodes in smart city crowdsensing improves crowd-
sourcer utility by up to 20% when compared to purely
vote-based trustworthiness. We have also shown that by the
deployment of anchor nodes in a smart city crowdsensing sce-
nario, crowd (user) utility is not reduced when compared to
purely vote-based trustworthiness assurance without anchors.
Moreover, disinformation probability at the crowdsourcer
platform can be eliminated if anchor-based trustworthiness
assurance is integrated with the decentralized component of
the trustworthiness assurance module of smart city crowd-
sensing. Based on our research findings, we conclude that
the size of the anchor population has to be selected properly
with respect to the detected adversary population; hence we
advocate the emergency of adaptive anchoring solutions for
smartphone users in smart city crowdsensing applications.
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